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I
n a pair of 5-4 rulings released 
on  June  26 ,  the  Un i t ed 
States Supreme Court held 
that Section 3 of the Defense 
o f  Marr iage  Ac t  (DOMA) 
violates the Fifth Amendment of the 
US Constitution, but that the court 
did not have jurisdiction to decide 
whether California’s Proposition 8 
violates the 14th Amendment, because 
the initiative’s Official Proponents, 
who appealed District Court Judge 
Vaughn Walker’s decision finding 
it unconstitutional, lack federal 
constitutional standing to have done so.
There is a 25-day period during 
which the Official Proponents can seek 
rehearing, after which the high court’s 
mandate in the Prop 8 case will go to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which must then issue an order dis-
missing the appeal and lifting the stay 
on Walker’s 2010 ruling.
At that point, later in July or early 
in August, same-sex marriages could 
once again become available through-
out California, though the Official Pro-
ponents may yet argue that Walker’s 
order does not apply to anyone other 
than the two plaintiff couples or the 
two counties sued and thereby delay 
that outcome.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Jr., 
wrote for the high court in the chal-
lenge that Edith (“Edie”) Schlain Wind-
sor, a New York widow, brought against 
DOMA based on a $360,000 inheri-
tance tax imposed on her after the 
death of her spouse, Thea Spyer. He 
produced a somewhat typical Kennedy 
opinion that obscures the ruling’s doc-
trinal basis and will leave commenta-
tors and lower courts guessing as to its 
effect in subsequent cases.
He referred to liberty protected by 
the US Constitution’s due process 
clause, federalism issues related to 
the traditional authority of the states 
to decide who can marry, and the 
equal protection requirements that the 
Court has found to be part of the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process clause.
In some respects, his opinion evoked 
his 1996 opinion for the court in Romer 
v. Evans, which struck down a Colo-
rado voter amendment that prohibited 
any nondiscrimination laws based on 
sexual orientation in that state. Kenne-
dy’s argument regarding DOMA rested 
on the idea that any enactment whose 
clear purpose and effect are to treat 
some people adversely, creating a sort 
of second-class citizenship, is uncon-
stitutional on its face, without much 
need for further analysis.
At the March 27 oral arguments, 
Jus t i c e  Ru th  Bade r  G insburg 
described state marriage without fed-
eral benefits as “skim milk marriage.” 
Kennedy did not adopt that nomencla-
ture, instead referring to second-class 
marriage.
As usual with Kennedy, his opinion 
avoids the technical terminology of 
constitutional analysis many commen-
tators use in describing what standard 
of judicial review applies to the case, 
so it is not easy to classify it among 
categories including “strict scrutiny,” 
“heightened scrutiny,” “suspect classi-
fications,” or “rational basis.” 
The court, therefore, avoided set-
tling the differences between standards 
applied by the trial court, which used 
the most deferential scrutiny in evalu-
ating DOMA and found it lacks any 
defensible rational basis, and the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
found that “heightened scrutiny” 
should apply to sexual orientation dis-
crimination cases, a situation in which 
the government must show a compel-
ling non-discriminatory purpose for a 
law. The appeals panel, while uphold-
ing Windsor’s trial court win, noted 
that DOMA’s Section 3 would survive a 
less demanding, more deferential ratio-
nal basis review.
Kennedy’s approach in this respect 
was at least a small disappointment for 
Windsor’s counsel, Roberta Kaplan of 
Paul, Weiss LLP, and the LGBT Rights 
Project at the American Civil Liberties 
Union, who had hoped that a “height-
ened scrutiny” ruling by the Supreme 
Court could be used in other cases, 
especially pending cases challenging 
state bans on same-sex marriage in 
other parts of the country. Claims of 
discrimination raised regarding laws 
subjected to heightened scrutiny are 
more difficult to defend against.
As usual when responding to a Ken-
nedy gay rights opinion, Justice Anto-
nin Scalia’s dissent expressed relief 
that the court had not used height-
ened scrutiny to strike down the 1996 
law, but he then expressed puzzlement 
about its basis. After summarizing and 
criticizing Kennedy’s analysis, Scalia 
wrote, “Some might conclude that this 
loaf could have used a while longer in 
the oven. But that would be wrong; it 
is already overcooked. The most expert 
care in preparation cannot redeem a 
bad recipe. The sum of all the court’s 
non-specific hand-waving is that this 
law is invalid (maybe on equal-protec-
tion grounds, maybe on substantive-
due-process grounds, and perhaps 
with some amorphous federalism com-
ponent playing a role) because it is 
motivated by a ‘bare… desire to harm’ 
couples in same-sex marriages.”
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ste-
phen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and 
Elena Kagan joined Kennedy’s decision 
and did not write separately. 
President Barack Obama promptly 
issued a statement applauding the 
court’s ruling and said he had directed 
Attorney General Eric Holder “to work 
with other members of my Cabinet 
to review all relevant federal statutes 
to ensure this decision, including its 
implications for federal benefits and 
obligations, is implemented swiftly and 
smoothly.”
In a press conference to discuss the 
Prop 8 ruling, Chad Griffin, the presi-
dent of the Human Rights Campaign, 
said he had spoken to Holder “to dis-
cuss with him an expedited implemen-
tation of the DOMA ruling.”
This is especially good news for bi-
national married same-sex couples, 
whose marriages can now be recog-
nized as equal to those of different-sex 
couples, and it eliminates the need to 
amend the immigration reform legisla-
tion pending in Congress, something 
that even reform advocates who are 
marriage equality supporters, like New 
York Senator Chuck Schumer, have 
warned could derail that bill’s pros-
pects. 
Under the president’s directive, 
those federal statutes that contain spe-
cialized marriage definitions for par-
ticular policy purposes should now 
be construed to treat lawful same-sex 
marriages the same as lawful different-
sex marriages.
However, as Scalia pointed out in 
his acerbic dissent, the court’s opin-
ion is obscure on one very important 
question — whether lawfully mar -
ried same-sex couples who live, work, 
or travel in states that don’t recognize 
same-sex marriages will be recog-
nized as married for federal purposes 
in such locations should the question 
arise. Kennedy ended his opinion with 
a cryptic statement, “This opinion and 
its holding are confined to those law-
ful marriages.” That sentence followed 
a passage criticizing DOMA because it 
“singles out a class of persons deemed 
by a State entitled to recognition and 
protection to enhance their own liber-
ty” and has the effect of “disparag[ing] 
and injur[ing] those whom the State, by 
its marriage laws, sought to protect in 
personhood and dignity.”
This section of Kennedy’s opinion 
relies on principles of federalism, under 
which a state may, presumably, decide 
not to perform or recognize same-sex 
marriages unless, of course Kennedy’s 
due process and equal protection con-
cerns would override that state’s reser-
vations. That’s a question he does not 
resolve in his opinion.
There were three dissenting opin-
ions. Scalia’s dissent was joined by 
Justice Clarence Thomas and, in part, 
by Chief Justice John Roberts, who 
wrote his own dissent as well. Jus-
tice Samuel Alito also wrote a dissent, 
which was joined in part by Thom-
as. Roberts and Scalia argued that 
the court did not have jurisdiction to 
decide the DOMA case, because the 
Justice Department, whose appeal 
was granted in this case, agreed with 
the rulings by the trial court and the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Con-
sequently, the parties before the court 
were not “adverse” on the merits and 
so lacked a true “case or controversy” 
as required by the Constitution. They 
both suggested that it was not appro-
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priate for the government to ask the 
Supreme Court to affirm a lower court 
decision with which the government 
agrees.
The chief justice’s dissent stressed 
the “federalism” aspects of Kennedy’s 
opinion, a focus that could lessen its 
significance for pending challenges to 
state same-sex marriage bans. Roberts 
pointed to the fact that Kennedy’s opin-
ion purported to take no position on 
the question whether same-sex couples 
have a right to marry under the 14th 
Amendment. He said “the disclaimer 
is a logical and necessary consequence 
of the argument that the majority has 
chosen to adopt. The dominant theme 
of the majority opinion is that the fed-
eral government’s intrusion in an area 
‘central to state domestic relations law 
applicable to its residents and citizens’ 
is sufficiently ‘unusual’ to set off alarm 
bells. I think the majority goes off 
course, as I have said, but it is undeni-
able that its judgment is based on fed-
eralism.”
As such, Roberts would argue, it has 
no relevance to disputes over the basic 
question of whether same-sex couples 
have an underlying right to marry.
Roberts did not join the part of Sca-
lia’s colorfully worded dissent where he 
disagreed with Kennedy on the merits 
of the case. Scalia discounted Kenne-
dy’s disclaimer that the court was not 
deciding whether same-sex couples 
have a constitutional right to marry, 
predicting that lower courts would rely 
on his opinion to strike down state 
restrictions on same-sex marriage. In 
fact, Scalia took the unusual step of 
demonstrating how a lower court could 
appropriate paragraphs from Kenne-
dy’s opinion, change a few of the words, 
and produce a result requiring a state 
to let same-sex couples marry. Scalia’s 
dissents in gay rights cases are usu-
ally packed with impassioned rhetoric, 
and this was no exception, but this is 
the first time he actually shows lower 
courts how to accomplish the terrible 
results he forecasts will occur. (Ten 
years ago to the day, in his dissent dis-
agreeing with Kennedy’s opinion in the 
Lawrence case that struck down sod-
omy laws nationwide, Scalia warned 
that opinion would open the way for 
gay marriage.) 
Alito, by contrast, argued in his dis-
sent that the intervention of Speaker 
John Boehner’s so-called Bipartisan 
Legal Advisory Group of the House 
of Representatives (BLAG) — which 
stepped in to defend DOMA when the 
Justice Department announced two 
years ago it would no longer do so — 
took care of the “case or controversy” 
problem. He suggested there is neces-
sarily a role for the courts to play when 
both the plaintiff and the government 
agree that a statute is unconstitution-
al. And he accepted BLAG’s contention 
that Congress has a legitimate interest 
in defending such a statute to protect 
its legislative authority.
Alito disagreed with Kennedy on 
the merits of the constitutional claim, 
asserting that whether the federal 
government must recognize same-
sex marriages was a political question 
not suitable for resolution by the high 
court.  Noting that the Constitution has 
nothing to say about same-sex mar-
riage one way or the other, he argued 
the issue should be left to individual 
states to decide through their political 
processes.
Chief Justice Roberts 
wrote for the majority in 
the Prop 8 case,  where he 
argued that amendment’s Official 
Proponents did not have standing to 
appeal Judge Walker’s ruling that it 
violated the 14th Amendment because 
they had no personal tangible stake in 
the outcome.
Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan 
joined the court’s opinion. Kennedy 
wrote a dissent joined by Thomas, 
Alito, and Sotomayor. Pundits will 
undoubtedly tie themselves in knots 
trying to figure out why three of the 
Democratic appointees joined Sca-
lia and the chief justice in the major-
ity while Sotomayor joined Kennedy 
and the court’s two most conservative 
members, Alito and Thomas, in the dis-
sent, especially since the four Demo-
cratic appointees were united in joining 
Kennedy’s decision on the merits in the 
Windsor case.
Although the immediate results of 
both decisions are clear, their longer-
term effects are not. The full meaning 
of a Supreme Court opinion cannot be 
determined on the day it is issued, but 
will depend on the responses of govern-
ment officials, legislators, and lower 
courts, as well as private sector actors.
Section 3 of DOMA is gone, but that 
does not necessarily mean that all the 
barriers to full equality in federal rights 
are necessarily eliminated or will all 
disappear overnight. The president’s 
prompt statement and the comments 
HRC’s Griffin made about his conver-
sations with the attorney general sug-
gest that by the time the high court 
issues its mandate in the Windsor case 
toward the end of July, there should 
be some guidance from the Justice 
Department so that all federal agen-
cies are on the same page concerning 
treatment of legally married same-sex 
couples.
It would be particularly helpful if this 
guidance addressed the issue of lawful-
ly married couples who reside in states 
that don’t recognize same-sex marriag-
es. The pending Respect for Marriage 
bill in Congress would mandate federal 
recognition for those marriages regard-
less of where the couple happens to live 
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